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THE EFFICACY OF GUARANTY CONTRACTS
IN SOPHISTICATED COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS
PETER A. ALCESt
Even though contracts of guaranty are not subject to uniform stan-
dards of interpretation throughout the states, both case law and statu-
tory development have tended to evidence a strong sympathy for the
guarantor. In spite of this trend, Professor 4ces suggests that credi-
tors' counsel can, through careful drafting, do much to assure the en-
forceability of the guaranty contract. 4 scrupulously structured
guaranty contract, one that anticipates possible defenses to liability in
explicit terms, may well be upheld, even in cases in which guarantors
occupied weak negotiating positions vis-&-vis creditors. Moreover, the
attack on the guaranty as afraudulent conveyance under section 548 of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 can also be successfully avoided
In this instance, the creditor should be prepared to make the argument
that solvency of the guarantor is to be assessed on the basis of a "going
concern" value. Thus, careful anticipatory drafting, and well-reasoned
analysis of "value" in the case of afraudulent conveyance attack, may
assist the creditor who seeks to enforce a contract of guaranty.
Contracts of guaranty arise in various contexts, take any one of several
forms, and may be either secured by real or personal' property or entirely
unsecured. 2 The law governing guaranties differs from state to state, and there
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1. Potential collateral for a guaranty may be the stock of the corporation whose obligation
the principal is asked to guaranty. In that case the creditor will require the guarantor to execute a
"Pledge Agreement," describing the parties' rights to the pledged stock, as well as a form of stock
power signed in blank in order to facilitate efficient disposition of the securities. Although the
value of the stock in the closely held corporate debtor is liable to b6 negligibl: by the time the
creditor would be interested in foreclosing on it, taking the stock in pledge alone with the attend-
ant voting rights is an effective way to preclude the guarantor's dealing with the stock in a manner
inconsistent with the creditor's best interests. In such transactions, however, the creditor must be
careful to avoid, to the extent practicable, allegations that the creditor is "in control" of the debtor.
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(25)(B)(iii) (Supp. V 1981) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which
defines "insider" as "a person in control of the debtor corporation," and consider the ramifications
of such a characterization in I 1 U.S.C. § 547 (Supp. V 1981), dealing with "Preferences" under the
Bankruptcy Code. Section 547(b)(4)(B)(i) extends the preference statute of limitations from 90
days to one year if "the creditor. . . was an insider, and. . . had reasonable cause to believe the
debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer." See also infra note 131.
2. The properties and characteristics of the so-called "guaranty" letter of credit are not con-
sidered in this article. See O'Grady v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 296 N.C. 212, 250 S.E.2d 587
(1978); Verkuil, Bank Solvency and Guaranty Letters of Credit, 25 STAN. L. REV. 716 (1973); Note,
Guaranty Letters of Credit: Problems and Possibilities, 16 Asux. L. REv. 822 (1974).
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is neither applicable uniform legislation 3 nor comprehensive federal legisla-
tion4 in the area. That dearth of statutory guidance has frustrated commercial
expectations. Current economic conditions5 and recent developments in the
law6 have called attention to the serious consequences that attend the inconsis-
tent treatment afforded contracts of guaranty in the courts.
A guaranty may be absolute, conditional, 7 general, special, 8 continuing,9
3. Certain provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) deal specifically with the
right of a guarantor, such as UCC § 3-606 (1978), which provides, in pertinent part:
Impairment of Recourse or of Collateral
(1) The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the extent that without such
party's consent the holder
(a) without express reservation of rights releases or agrees not to sue any person against
whom the party has to the knowledge of the holder a right of recourse or agrees to
suspend the right to enforce against such person the instrument or collateral or otherwise
discharges such person, except that failure or delay in effecting any required present-
ment, protest or notice of dishonor with respect to any such person does not discharge
any party as to whom presentment, protest or notice of dishonor is ineffective or unnec-
essary; or
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument given by or on behalf of the
party or any party against whom he has a right of recourse.
UCC § 3-606 (1978) is limited to guaranties of "negotiable" instruments; therefore, its application
is severely limited because many of the promissory notes used in sophisticated commercial trans.
actions do not fit the UCC § 3-104 (1978) definition:
(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article [3] must
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer, and
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and no
other promise, order, obligation or power given by the maker or drawer except as au-
thorized by this Article; and
(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(d) be payable to order or to bearer.
See also infra text accompanying notes 96-111. See generally Brennan & Burdick, Does the Guar-
antor Guarantee? Lender, Bewarel, I1 SETON HALL L. REv. 353 (1981); Hawkland, The Liablitp
of Accommodation Parties Under Article 3 of the Unifoim Commercial Code, 25 PRAc. LAW. 35
(1979).
4. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code), I 1 U.S.C. §§ 509 ("Claim of
codebtor"), 1301 ("Stay of action against codebtor") (Supp. V 1981) will have limited rather than
pervasive impact on contracts of guaranty.
5. See, eg., Petzinger, Taking Shelter: AM International Gets a Vital Second Chance by
Using Chapter 11, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1982, at 1, col. 6 (describing the plight of a large national
corporation and suggesting that the recession of the early part of this decade will subject many
business relations to scrutiny in bankruptcy courts).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 134-75.
7. The "absolute" guaranty and "conditional" guaranty are procedural opposites of one
another. Before a conditional guaranty may be enforced, certain prescribed conditions must be
satisfied. A creditor may enforce an absolute guaranty notwithstanding the occurrence or nonoc-
currence of any event either within or not within the contemplation of the parties at the time the
guaranty was executed. A guaranty is deemed absolute unless its terms import some condition to
the guarantor's liability. See Glickman v. Collins, 13 Cal. 3d 852, 533 P.2d 204, 120 Cal. Rptr. 76
(1975); Moffett v. Miller, 119 Cal. 2d 712, 260 P.2d 215 (1953); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n v. McRae, 81 Cal. App. 2d 1, 183 P.2d 385 (1947); Chios v. Marlow, 39 Colo. App. 218, -,
563 P.2d 387, 389 (1977); Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438 (Okla. 1980); Rucker v.
Republic Supply Co., 415 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1966). See also Bank of Kirkwood Plaza v. Mueller,
294 N.W.2d 640, 644 (N.D. 1980); State Bank v. Porter, 167 N.W.2d 527 (N.D. 1969); National
Bank v. Equity Inv., 81 Wash. 2d 886, 506 P.2d 39 (1973); Robey v. Walton Lumber Co., 17 Wash.
2d 242, 135 P.2d 95 (1943).
8. A "general" guaranty is made to no particular creditor, while a "special" guaranty vests
rights in the requesting creditor. See Joe Balestrieri & Co. v. Comm'r, 177 F.2d 867 (9th Cir.
1949); Austin v. New Brunswick Fire Ins. Co., 111 Mont. 192, 108 P.2d 1036 (1941).
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unlimited, 10 a guaranty of payment, or of collection or collectability. 1I Rather
than treat all the permutations of the foregoing types of guaranties, this article
focuses on the absolute, continuing, unlimited guaranty of payment made by
corporations, partnerships, and individuals. The article summarizes the signif-
icant considerations that bear upon the use of guaranties by discussing perti-
nent cases and legislative developments. The approach necessarily precludes
in-depth discussion of nonuniversal state law doctrines, but will include an
analysis of the relevant aspects of contract' 2 law, as well as the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code) and those procedures by which lend-
ers try to assure the enforceability of guaranties.13 Throughout the course of
the article, reference will be made to certain standard guaranty provisions.
The design is not to provide the foundation for a "canned form," but rather to
complement the substantive material with practical suggestions.
I. APPLICABLE CONTRACT LAW
The law governing contracts of guaranty is normally the general common
9. A "continuing" guaranty is not limited to an isolated transaction but contemplates a se-
ries of transactions, often for an indefinite period of time. See Standard Oil v. Houser, 101 Cal.
App. 2d 480, 225 P.2d 539 (1950); Valley Nat'l Bank v. Foreign Car Rental, Inc., 157 Colo. 545,
404 P.2d 272 (1965); Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Warner, 35 Colo. App. 434, 535 P.2d 1132
(1975); Ransom Distrib. Co. v. Lazy B Ltd., 35 Colo. App. 86, 532 P.2d 366 (1974); Bonura v.
Christian Bros. Poultry Co., 336 So. 2d 881 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Har-
ley, 13 So. 2d 84 (La. Ct. App. 1943); Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438 (Okla.
1980); Rucker v. Republic Supply Co., 415 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1966); Houston Furniture Distrib., Inc.
v. Bank of Woodlake, 562 S.W.2d 880 (rex. Civ. App. 1978); Reece v. First State Bank, 555
S.W.2d 929 (rex. Civ. App. 1977); Blount v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 432 S.W.2d 549 (rex.
Civ. App. 1968).
10. It is safer practice to avoid taking a limited guaranty because courts may be quite willing
to accept the arguments of a limited guarantor that follow this type of reasoning: when a guaranty
provides that the guarantor is to be liable for $300 of a $1000 indebtedness and only $500 of that
indebtedness remains unsatisfied at the time the creditor attempts to enforce the guaranty, it could
be concluded that the $300 guaranteed was part of the $500 already paid. If such an argument
were accepted by the court, the guarantor could be completely released from liability. To avoid
such a result, the standard form of unlimited guaranty should be used with the addition of lan-
guage to the effect that the guarantor's liability under the guaranty is limited to the specified
amount. For a recent case in which the foregoing analysis was apposite, see Memphis Sheraton
Corp. v. Kirkley, 640 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1981).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 16-22.
12. See Howell v. Comm'r, 69 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1934). The court noted in Howell that "the
liability of a guarantor is secondary and collateral, and its enforcement depends upon certain
conditions. The liability of a surety is original, primary and direct." Id at 450. See also Picket v.
Rigsbee, 252 N.C. 200, 113 S.E.2d 323 (1960); S.N.M.L. Corp. v. Bank of N.C., 41 N.C. App. 28,
254 S.E.2d 274 (1979). See generally L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SURErYSHIP 6
(1950); Radin, Guaranty and Suretyship, 17 CALIF. L. REv. 605 (1929); Note, The Waiver of De-
fenses by Guarantors in Guaranty Contracts and the Nonwaiver Provisions of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 5 VT. L. REV. 73 (1980). The article will not consider the impact of suretyship law.
13. Commentators have considered the corporate law issues surrounding contracts of guar-
anty, particularly the ultra vires doctrine. See Bird, The Guaranty: A Dilemma/or Corporate
Managers, 23 Sw. LJ. 872 (1969); Coquillette, Guaranty of and Security/or the Debt of a Parent
Corporation by a Subsidiary Corporation, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 433, 438-46 (1980); Kriedman,
The Corporate Guaranty, 13 VAND. L. REv. 229 (1959); Note, Upstream Financing and the Use of
the Corporate Guaranty, 53 NoTRE DAME LAW. 841 (1978); Note, The Corporate Guaranty Revis-
ited" Upstream, Downstream, and Beyond-A Statutory Approach, 32 RUT. L. REV. 312 (1979).
See also Annot., 71 A.L.R. 3d 639 (1976). In order to avoid undue repetition, this article will not
consider corporate law issues but will commend the reader to the exhaustive analyses cited above.
1983]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW[o
law of the several states.' 4 There are, however, some state statutes that con-
front specific issues.15 Such statutes are not pervasive, and, for the most part,
do little to promote uniformity among the states. This section of the article
will explore the applicable contract law as the necessary foundation for any
critical observations regarding contracts of guaranty.
A. Terminology
It is important at the outset to distinguish between a guaranty ofpayment
and a guaranty of collection. Perhaps the clearest description of that distinc-
tion is found in section 3-416 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which
is applicable in every jurisdiction in the United States: 16
Contract of Guarantor
(1) 'Payment guaranteed' or equivalent words added to a signature
mean that the signer engages that if the instrument is not paid when
due, he will pay it according to its tenor without resort by the holder
to any other party.
(2) 'Collection guaranteed' or equivalent words added to a signa-
ture mean that the signer engages that if the instrument is not paid
when due, he will pay it according to its tenor, but only after the
holder has reduced his claim against the maker or acceptor [principal
debtor] to judgment and execution has been returned unsatisfied, or
after the maker or acceptor has become insolvent or it is otherwise
apparent that it is useless to proceed against him.
(3) Words of guaranty which do not otherwise specify guarantee
payment.
While Article 3 of the UCC is directed specifically to matters of negotiable
instrument law,' 7 the distinction presented in section 3-416 is useful outside
the body of law governing commercial paper.' 8 The section provides a pre-
14. "Contracts of guaranty are subject to the ... general law of contract when not otherwise
provided." O'Grady v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 296 N.C. 212, 220, 250 S.E.2d 587, 593 (1978).
See also RESTATEMENT OF LAW OF SECURITY § 82 comment g (1941). See generally Dole, Notice
Requirements in Guaranty Contracts, 62 MICH. L. REv. 57 (1963).
15. See, eg., OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 321-344 (1971); infra text accompanying notes 118-26.
See also NEw YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR
1961, at 279-80 (1961); supra note 3.
16. While Louisiana has not adopted Articles 2 or 9, the State has chosen to join the rest of
the nation insofar as commercial paper is concerned.
17. See supra note 3.
18. A guaranty of payment has been defined as an absolute undertaking to pay a debt at
maturity if the principal obligor does not do so. Preferred Inv. Co. v. Westbrook, 174N.W.2d 391,
395 (Iowa 1970). Accord Midway Nat'l Bank v. Gustafson, 282 Minn. 73, 165 N.W.2d 218 (1969);
Bank of Sun Prairie v. Opstein, 86 Wis. 2d 669, 273 N.W.2d 279 (1979); United States v. Klebe
Tool & Die Co., 5 Wis. 2d 392, 92 N.W.2d 868 (1958). See Annot., 53 A.L.R. 2d 522 (1957);
Annot., 14 A.L.R. 924 (1921). A guaranty of collection, on the other hand, is conditional. It
merely binds the guarantor to pay if the claim guaranteed is not collectible by due diligence.
Ammerman v. Miller, 488 F.2d 1285, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1973); accord Schaeffer v. Gilmer, 353 So.
2d 847 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Northwestern Bank v. Cortner, 275 So. 2d 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1973); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Blue Bird Restaurant & Lounge, Inc., 279 So.2d 720
(La. Ct. App. 1973); State Bank v. Porter, 167 N.W.2d 527 (N.D. 1969); see also supra note 7. For
cases distinguishing between the two forms of guaranty, see State Bank v. Porter, 167 N.W.2d 527
(N.D. 1969); Robey v. Walter Lumber Co., 17 Wash. 2d 242, 135 P.2d 95 (1943).
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sumption in favor or reading a signature (perhaps indorsement) as constituting
a guaranty of payment.19 The crucial difference between a gauranty of pay-
ment and a guaranty of collection involves the procedural prerequisite to en-
forcement of the guaranty. The creditor who has received the guaranty of
collection must prosecute his claim against the principal debtor to judgment
(and perhaps beyond) with "due diligence" 20 before he may collect from the
guarantor.21 That precondition involves potentially significant time and ex-
pense and forces the creditor to make numerous tactical decisions, any one or
more of which may be attacked as manifesting something less than "due
diligence."22
Courts often strictly construe guaranties of collection to deny recovery
against the guarantor. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently
found a "final decision" lacking in M W. Zack Metal v. International Naviga-
tion Corp. ofMonrovia.23 The guaranty provided that "the undersigned com-
pany herewith guarantees to pay upon first request the agreed sum, plus
interest and costs, in the amount to which the plaintiff is entitled pursuant to a
final decision of the German courts or on basis of a settlement agreement." 24
Because the German appeals court had failed to make an accounting of costs
and interest, the court of appeals held that there was no "final decision" as
intended by the contract of guaranty. The court was not persuaded by the
argument that the assessment of interest and costs was a mere clarification of
the extent of the guarantor's liability25 rather than a prerequisite determina-
tion that a "final decision" had been rendered. 26
While a survey of the issues surrounding prejudgment remedies, post-
judgment remedies, and the interstices of such procedures is outside the scope
of this article, in general the practical difficulties that attend such collection
devices mitigate in favor of avoiding guaranties of collection at all costs. The
19. Compare Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. McRae, 81 Cal. App. 2d 1, 183 P.2d
385 (1947) [and] Rucker v. Republic Supply Co., 415 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1966) (both finding a pre-
sumption in favor of reading a guaranty as absolute) with Liquidating Midland Bank v. Stecker,
40 Ohio App. 510, 179 N.E. 504 (1930) (in which the court found that use of the word "guaranty"
suggests a conditional rather than absolute obligation to pay).
20. See Greene v. Martin W. Hysong Co., 193 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1963); First Nat'l Bank v.
Southern Cotton Oil Co., 76 Ga. App. 779, 47 S.E.2d 288 (1948); U.S. Rubber Co. v. Champs
Tires, Inc., 73 NJ. Super. 364, 180 A.2d 145 (App. Div. 1962).
21. If the creditor does not pursue the claim against the principal debtor with due diligence,
the creditor will not be able to maintain an action against the guarantor. Such lack of due dili-
gence may have also prejudiced the guarantor's subrogation right, see infra text accompanying
notes 49-58, and thereby released the guarantor. See also Schaeffer v. Gilmer, 353 So. 2d 847 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Keller v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 233 La. 320, 96 So. 2d 598
(1957); Bank of Kirkwood Plaza v. Mueller, 294 N.W.2d 640 (N.D. 1980); Van Petten v. Oregon
Bank, 42 Or. App. 367, 600 P.2d 507 (1979).
22. For example, if the creditor delays the initiation of litigation against the principal debtor
in hopes of reaching an out of court settlement, the creditor may be found to have shown less than
due diligence if the delay turns out to have compromised the creditor's litigation posture.
23. 675 F.2d 525 (1982).
24. Id at 530 n.7.
25. See id at 530-32 (Cardamone, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
26. For North Carolina cases that deal with the crucial distinction between guaranties of
payment and collection, see Investment Properties v. Norburn, 281 N.C. 191, 188 S.E.2d 342
(1972); Arcady Farms Milling Co. v. Wallace, 242 N.C. 686, 89 S.E.2d 413 (1955); American Bank
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problems associated with enforcing collection guaranties mandate that they
only be used when competitive factors absolutely require. In light of the typi-
cal negotiating posture between creditor (stronger) and debtor (weaker), com-
petitive factors seldom so require. Thus, the form of guaranty used most
typically by creditors is a guaranty of payment.
The creditor will insist upon a continuing guaranty when a sequence of
advances27 are to be made to the principal debtor.28 Such a guaranty is not
restricted to a simple isolated transaction and may be effective for an indefinite
time until revoked. Guaranty contracts in commercial finance transactions29
are typically continuing because such transactions contemplate future ad-
vances30 to the principal obligor over the term of the credit agreement.
31
B. Defenses to Guaranty Liability
Perhaps as a result of a judicial preference for debtors or lawmakers' fear
of creditor oveq'eaching, or a combination of the two, the enactment of statu-
tory law and the evolution of common law have betrayed a discernible defer-
ence to any party that becomes obligated to answer for the debt of another.
32
Many of the cases may be reconciled only by concluding that when confronted
with a guarantor who elicits sympathy, the courts are willing to find numerous
reasons to abrogate the guaranty contract. This sentimental deference to the
plight of the guarantor has seldom been the source of venerable legal princi-
ples.3 3 The courts are not always careful in articulating the bases of their
& Trust Co. v. Elzey, 26 N.C. App. 29, 214 S.E.2d 800, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 252, 217 S.E.2d 662
(1975); First Nat'l Bank v. Black, 10 N.C. App. 270, 178 S.E.2d 108 (1970).
27. UCC § 9-204(3) (1978) validates "future advances": "In line with the policy of this
Article toward after-acquired property interests this subsection validates the future advance inter-
est, provided only that the obligation be covered by the security agreement." Id comment 5.
28. "Where by the terms of the written guaranty it appears that the parties look to a future
course of dealing or a succession of credits, it is generally considered a continuing guaranty."
Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Cassidy, 275 111. 462, 465, 114 N.E. 181, 184 (1916). See supra note 9.
29. Commercial finance transactions are defined as those "secured lending relationships in-
volving loans secured by accounts receivable, with or without other collateral." PRACrICINo LAW
INST., COMMERCIAL FINANCE, FAcrORING AND OTHER AssEr-BASED LENDING 11 (1980). In
general usage, commercial finance is understood as encompassing asset-based lending, lending
against the strength of the debtor's assets, and not his general reputation, business performance, or
capability. See generally id
30. The typical future advance clause will be found in the definition section of the loan
agreement under the caption "Indebtedness," "Liabilities," or "Obligations." The pertinent part
of a "Liabilities" definition may read as follows: "'Liabilities' shall refer to all liabilities, obliga-
tions, and indebtedness of any and every kind, whether heretofore, now, or hereafter owing, ans-
ing, due or payable from Borrower to Lender." The security interest, then, will be granted to
secure those "Liabilities."
31. Typically the loan is extended to provide the borrower with working capital, as opposed
to asset or stock acquisition funding.
32. The statutes of frauds in virtually every state require all contracts that answer for the debt
of another to be in writing to be enforceable. See, e.g., Warren v. White, 251 N.C. 729, 112 S.E.2d
522 (1960) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-1 (as then in effect; current version, 1965)).
33. If the sentiment of the North Carolina Supreme Court in O'Grady v. First Union Nat'l
Bank, 296 N.C. 212,250 S.E.2d 587 (1978), is an accurate indication, creditors taking guaranties in
the state should be most careful. In O'Grady the supreme court invoked the rules that "the terms
of a written contract are to be construed most strongly against the party who drafted the instru-
ment." id. at 227, 250 S.E.2d at 597 (citing Jones v. Palace Realty Co., 226 N.C. 303, 305, 37
[Vol. 61
GU,4R4NTY CONTRACTS
decisions or in cogently applying the available doctrines.34
The only practical response by creditors' legal counsel necessarily resem-
bles something of a shotgun approach. Corporate and commercial attorneys
have drafted guaranty forms that are designed to avoid the proguarantor law.
Many of the terms of such guaranties seem tautological because they are
closely related to or are even mere permutations of the defenses to guaranty
liability that they are intended to obviate. It must be reiterated that all of the
defenses are not available in all jurisdictions.
1. Creditor Action that Increases Guarantor's Risk
It is generally understood that the contract of guaranty is separate and
distinct from the contract between the creditor and the principal debtor.35
Practically speaking, however, that distinction has received uneven treatment
in some jurisdictions. In many cases, if the principal obligation is extin-
guished, the guarantor's obligation is also extinguished.36 Similarly, a classic
defense recognized by the courts arises when the creditor in some way fails to
honor its obligation to the debtor.37 A guarantor may, by the assertion of that
defense, avoid part or all of his liability to the creditor.38
A New York case provides a useful illustration of this type of defense to
guaranty liability. In Walcult v. Clevile Corp. 39 the New York Court of Ap-
peals drew a subtle distinction between a guarantor's assertion of an independ-
ent cause of action existing in favor of his principal as a defense or
counterclaim,4° and a defense to liability based on a total or partial failure of
S.E.2d 906, 907 (1946)), and "the liability of a guarantor is not to be enlarged beyond the strict
terms of the contract," id at 227, 250 S.E.2d at 597 (citing George D. Witt Shoe Co. v. Peacock,
150 N.C. 448, 449, 64 S.E. 437, 438 (1909)) to reach a very proguarantor result arguably founded
on grammatical niceties rather than thoughtful legal analysis.
34. See, ag., Manufacturers Trading Corp. v. Harding, 181 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1950); infra
text accompanying notes 62-63.
35. Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438, 441 (Okla. 1980). Several North Caro-
lina decisions have acknowledged that a guaranty is collateral to the creditor-principal debtor
contract and creates secondary liability. See, e.g., EAC Credit Corp. v. Wilson, 281 N.C. 140, 144,
187 S.E.2d 752, 754 (1972); Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales Co., 259 N.C. 400, 418,
131 S.E.2d 9,23 (1963) (citing 24 AM. JUR. Guaranty § 11, at 879-80 (1939) (guaranty requires two
contracts, one binding the principal debtor, and the other engaging the responsibility of the
guarantor).
36. Woods-Tucker Leasing v. Kellum, 641 F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Central
Soya Co. v. Epstein Fisheries, Inc., 676 F.2d 939, 943 (7th Cir. 1982).
37. See also 10 S. WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs § 1213 (3d ed. 1967). Cf. Keystone Acceptance
Corp. v. Dynalectron Corp., 445 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (creditor barred from recovering from
guarantor when creditor does not completely fulfill the agreement with principal debtor); Credit
Managers Ass'n v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 392, 124 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1975) (guarantor may
assert any defense that the principal debtor could assert).
38. For discussion of partial or complete discharge of guarantors of negotiable instruments,
see Provident Bank v. Gast, 57 Ohio St. 2d 102, 386 N.E.2d 1357 (1979); Note, Discharge of Guar-
antors Under U C. C. § 3-606-Total or Pro-Rata Discharge Upon Release of 4nother Guarantor, 9
CAP. U.L. REv. 365 (1979).
39. 13 N.Y.2d 48, 191 N.E.2d 894, 241 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1963).
40. The court observed:
The situation [in the instant case] is readily distinguishable from cases in which the rule
was fashioned that a guarantor when sued alone by the creditor cannot avail himself of
an independent cause of action existing in favor of his principal as a defense or counter-
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the creditor to perform obligations due the principal debtor. The facts of the
case are sufficiently complex to warrant discussion. The three plaintiffs were
sole shareholders41 of several corporations dealing in phonographic supplies.
In February of 1959 plaintiffs sold their stock to defendant Clevite Corpora-
tion (Clevite) in return for stock in Clevite and signed noncompetition agree-
ments with a ten-year duration. Plaintiff Walcutt also agreed to provide
certain consulting services for $20,000 per year. The remaining plaintiffs were
each to receive $10,000 per year for each of the ten years. Although the agree-
ments were assignable, they also provided that Clevite would remain liable in
the event the assignee defaulted. 42
In September of 1960 Clevite sold the assets of the phonographic supply
business to one Richmond with the understanding that Richmond would form
a new corporation, Walco Electronics Company, Inc. (Walco) and transfer the
assets to Walco. The new corporation, in turn, asshmed the liability to plain-
tiffs. When Walco defaulted on the payments, plaintiffs brought suit against
Clevite (for breach of the payment provisions of the noncompetition agree-
ments) and against Richmond on his personal guaranty to Clevite of the pay-
ment obligation under the agreements assumed by Walco. 43 Richmond
responded that Clevite (the "creditor") made fraudulent representations to
Richmond (the "guarantor") and Walco (the "debtor") concerning the assets
transferred and, that relying upon such representations and warranties, Rich-
mond and Walco were "induced to have Walco purchase the said [sic] inven-
tories and other assets."44 Essentially, Richmond alleged inventory shortages,
a defense of partial failure of consideration.
The court framed the issue in this way: "[Whether a guarantor, when
sued alone, may avail himself of the defense of apartial failure of considera-
tion arising out of the main contract." 45 The opinion acknowledged that there
is no difficulty in those circumstances in which the creditor totally fails to per-
form its obligations to the principal debtor.46 The court went further, however
and held that "[w]here the consideration fails, either partially or entirely,
neither the principal debtor nor the guarantor is accountable for anything
claim.. . . Thus a guarantor may not interpose his principal's defense of fraud since
by doing so he would deprive the principal of his independent right to affirm or disaffirm
.... Likewise, he may not assert his principal's claim of breach of warranty since "he
might thus bar a large claim in cancelling a small one."
Id at 55, 191 N.E.2d at 897, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 838 (quoting Gillespie v. Torrance, 25 N.Y. 306, 311
(1862) and citing Ettlinger v. Nat'l Surety Co., 221 N.Y. 467, 468, 117 N.E. 945, 946 (1917)); Elliot
v. Brady, 192 N.Y. 221, 85 N.E. 69 (1908); Lasher v. Williamson, 55 N.Y. 619 (1874); Gillespie v.
Torrance, 25 N.Y. 306 (1862)).
41. The fourth shareholder died prior to the commencement of the trial. 13 N.Y.2d at 52,
191 N.E.2d at 895, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
42. Id at 54, 191 N.E.2d at 897, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
43. The court noted, "Plaintiff's claims ... are based upon the theory that they are third-
party beneficiaries of Richmond's guarantee to Clevite, and, as such, are subject to all the equities
between the parties to that agreement." Id at 54, 191 N.E.2d at 897, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 837 (citing
Detmer Woolen Co. v. Van Horn, 59 Misc. 163, 110 N.Y.S. 312 (1908)).
44. 13 N.Y.2d at 54, 191 N.E.2d at 896, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 837.
45. Id at 55, 191 N.E.2d at 897, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 838 (emphasis added).
46. See 10 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1264 (3d ed. 1967).
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which has not been received." 47 Under this approach the guarantor may par-
tially avoid its liability to the creditor. In light of the basic contract doctrine
relied on by the New York Court of Appeals, it is unclear whether a creditor
would be able to "contract-away" such a result when a guarantor asserts par-
tial or complete failure of consideration.48 That does not, however, mean that
creditors cannot or will not try to preclude the interposition of such a defense
by drafting an appropriate waiver into their form of guaranty.4 9
In O'Grady v. First Union National Bank50 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina considered a situation in which the guarantors by their execution of
the form of guaranty provided by the bank undertook to guarantee the per-
formance of three principal debtors. Because of an irregularity in the bank's
documentation of the transaction, only two, rather than the intended three
debtors, were primarily liable on the debt. The court cited North Carolina
authority for the proposition that "a material alteration of a contract between
principal and creditor will discharge a surety. ... 51 The omittance or re-
lease of a principal destroys a surety's rights of subrogation against that princi-
pal."52 The court applied this rule to permit the guarantor to avoid any liabil-
ity whatsoever on the guaranty.
To "avoid releasing the guarantor a creditor must not in any way compro-
mise the guarantor's subrogation right. In Sterling Factors Corp. v. Frei.nan53
a New York court held that the creditor's failure to protect the giiarantor's
subrogation right released the guarantor. The court found in favor of the
guarantor because the creditor's actions had effectively released the collateral
securing the principal debt, rendering the guarantor's subrogation right worth-
less.54 Similarly, in First Bank and Trust Co. v. Post5 5 the court held that the
47. 13 N.Y.2d at 56, 191 N.E.2d at 897, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
48. See also Manufacturers Trading Corp. v. Harding 181 F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1950).
49. The form of guaranty could provide: "The guarantor agrees that its obligations under
this guaranty shall be absolute and unconditional, irrespective of any defenses available to the
principal debtor arising under that certain Loan and Security Agreement between the Creditor
and the principal debtor of even date herewith." Standardized forms of guaranty often provide
that the guarantor's obligations shall be absolute and unconditional, irrespective of "any circum-
stance which might otherwise constitute a legal or equitable discharge or defense of or by a guar-
antor." It is suggested that such a term may be so broad as to be unenforceable, perhaps on
grounds of unconscionability. A court might very well be more willing to enforce the waiver of a
defense if the defense were more particularly described in the form signed by the guarantor.
The complaints of "unfortunate" lenders notwithstanding, there does exist a sound legal basis
for requiring a creditor to treat his principal obligor with considerable deference. The common
law provides that a guarantor who discharges the obligation of the principal debtor is subrogated
to the claim of the creditor to the extent that the guarantor has contributed to the discharge. See
United States v. Frisk, 675 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Ballard, 674 F.2d 330 (5th
Cir. 1982); Phares v. Barbour, 49 Ill. 370 (1868); RLE.A. Constr. Co. v. Ervin Co., 33 N.C. App.
472, 235 S.E.2d 418 (1977); W. DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 239 (2d ed. 1956);
RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 132 (1941). See also discussion of UCC § 3-606 (1978), supra note
3.
50. 296 N.C. 212, 250 S.E.2d 587 (1978).
51. Id at 224, 250 S.E.2d at 598 (citing Fleming v. Borden, 127 N.C. 214, 215, 37 S.E. 219,
220 (1900); Hinton v. Greenleaf, 113 N.C. 6, 7, 18 S.E. 56, 57 (1893)).
52. 296 N.C. at 224, 250 S.E.2d at 598.
53. 50 Misc. 2d 715, 271 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
54. See also Osborne v. Smith, 18 F. 126 (D. Minn. 1883).
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creditor's failure to file a financing statement5 6 constituted a significant im-
pairment of the security for the principal obligor's debt and effected a release
of the guarantor.5 7 Again, a creditor may avoid releasing the guarantor in
such a situation if the guaranty contract provides that the guarantor will re-
main bound notwithstanding the creditor's failure to perfect his security inter-
est in the collateral securing the principal debtor's obligation.58
A particularly interesting case dealing with the effect of increased risk to
guarantors is State Bank of East Moline v. Gus Cirivello, 59 a 1978 decision of
the Illinois Supreme Court. Thirteen parties intended to sign as coguarantors
of a loan extended by the plaintiff bank. Ultimately, however, only twelve
signatures appeared on the guaranty. The form of guaranty used by the bank
provided that the guaranty was unconditional. The court did not feel con-
strained by the language of the guaranty contract and held that the execution
of the form by all of the originally-intended guarantors constituted a condition
precedent to the liability of any of the guarantors. Each of the actual guaran-
tor's risk was increased because there were only twelve instead of thirteen
guarantors among whom the risk could be apportioned. 60
Perhaps carrying a good idea too far, courts have also granted guarantors
relief when there is any modification whatsoever of the contract between the
creditor and the principal debtor unless the consent of the guarantor is first
55. 10 Il1. App. 3d 127, 293 N.E.2d 907 (1973).
56. See UCC § 9-402 (1978), describing the elements of a financing statement.
57. See also Piasecki v. Fidelity Corp., 339 Mich. 328, 330, 63 N.W.2d 671, 673 (1954). But
see American Bank of Commerce v. Covolo, 88 N.M. 405, 540 P.2d 1294 (1975), in which the
court found that the creditor-bank's failure to properly perfect a collateral interest in a liquor
license with the State Beverage Control Department did not absole the guarantors of liability.
58. Such a waiver may be phrased in substantially these terms:
The guarantor agrees that its obligations hereunder shall be absolute and unconditional
irrespective of any failure by the Creditor to take any steps to preserve its rights to any
security or collateral for the Liabilities or the release of all or any portion of the collat-
eral by the Creditor or the Creditor's failure to perfect or keep perfected its security
interest or lien in any portion of the collateral.
59. 74 Ill. 2d 426, 386 N.E.2d 43 (1978).
60. See Miami Nat'l Bank v. Fink, 174 So. 2d 38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (guaranty unen-
forceable against guarantor when condition that the SBA participate m loan as guarantor re-
mained unfulfilled); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Sampson, 496 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (where
guaranty agreement is joint rather than joint and several, the release of one of the joint obligors
operates as a release of the other joint obligors). But see Commercial Credit Corp. v. Sorgel, 274
F.2d 449 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 834 (dismissal with prejudice of two of three coguaran-
tors does not release the third guarantor); Williams v. Reed, 113 Cal. App. 2d 195, 248 P.2d 147
(1952) (Release of one joint guarantor of a promissory note does not extinguish the obligation of
any of the others); Oil Tool Exch. v. Schuh, 67 Cal. App. 2d 288, 153 P.2d 976 (1944) (The satis-
faction of a judgment against one guarantor does not release another guarantor from liability);
Hall v. First Nat'l Bank, 145 Ga. App. 267, 243 S.E.2d 569 (1978) (discharge of two guarantors
through refusal to accept their tenders does not ipso facto result in discharge of a third guarantor).
A 1979 decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals construed the effect of a coguarantor's
termination of his guaranty obligation on the nonterminating guarantor's liability. The court
found that the nonterminating guarantor's liability was not extinguished. The coguarantors were
not 'Jointly responsible for a particular amount of credit extended to the corporation, but instead
*. . each of them [was] liable to a maximum of $10,000, just as if a separate guaranty had been
signed by each of them." Pearce Young Angel Co. v. Don Becker Enter., Inc., 43 N.C. App. 690,
694, 260 S.E.2d 104, 106 (1979).
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obtained.61 An example of such a result is found in a decision of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, Manufacturers Trading Corp. v. Harding.62 Plaintiff
finance company purchased and took assignments of accounts receivable from
Skandia, and Harding indemnified plaintiff against any loss resulting from the
assignment of the accounts. The accounts were fraudulent. At Skandia's re-
quest plaintiff had assigned the accounts to a third party, and when it was
discovered that the accounts were not genuine, plaintiff and the third-party
assignee reached a compromise agreement. The assignment to the third party
was accomplished through a reassignment to Skandia and an immediate as-
signment to the third party. The court held:
[i]nasmuch as the guarantors and the indemnifiers had merely agreed
to guarantee the collection of the accounts receivable and to protect
plaintiff against loss, when plaintiff was completely reimbursed for its
original outlay and the subject matter of the contract redelivered to
Skandia, the liability of the guarantors ended .... [The guarantors]
never made any guaranty of protection of plaintiff against liability
for its own misrepresentation.63
Thus, the modification of the contract between the creditor and the principal
debtor released the guarantors. Certainly it may be argued that the reassign-
ment in Harding represents an extreme type of "modification"; nevertheless, it
is difficult to justify the result reached by the court. It appears that the equities
did not lie with the guarantors, who were afforded significant protection by the
court, but with the plaintiff who was the victim of fraud. As the opinion does
not reproduce the form of guaranty used by Manufacturers Trading Corpora-
tion, however, it is not clear whether a Harding result could be precluded by a
careful, complete drafting of the guaranty and a particularly indulgent solici-
tude of the guarantor's rights over the course of the credit relationship when-
ever there is the slightest possibility that those rights might be implicated. It
would appear that the reasoning in Harding could obtain even if the modifica-
tion benefits the guarantor, by reducing either the likelihood of principal
debtor default or the extent of the guarantor's potential liability.
The foregoing cases suggest that a creditor's arguments, no matter how
reasonable, might not prevail when directed at a guarantor favored by the
court. How, then, may a creditor safely deal with the many modifications and)
waivers that are typically encountered during the course of a credit relation,
ship? Though by no means a safe harbor, a creditor can place some reliance
on the guarantor's advance consent (at the time the guaranty is executed) to
any and all modifications-and-waiers; such consent would naturally be a pro-
vision of the guaranty form itself. Attorneys should not be reluctant to de-
scribe explicitly the modifications and waivers to which the guarantor is being
61. The guaranty form may contain a provision pursuant to which the guarantor acknowl-
edges that no modification of the contract between the creditor and the principal debtor will affect
the liability of the guarantor. Courts confronted with partial or total failure of the consideration
flowing to the debtor from the creditor may not feel constrained by such a waiver clause. See
supra text accompanying notes 39-49.
62. 181 F.2d 609 (1950).
63. Id at 611-12.
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asked to give his prior consent; the use of examples would be entirely
appropriate.64
In any event, advance consent will not be relied upon to the exclusion of
other safeguards. Written consents are obtained from all guarantors when the
terms of the contract between the creditor and principal debtor are altered in
any way.65 In fact, a written acknowledgement could be secured from the
guarantor each time the principal debtor requests a waiver of a contract
term.6
6
2. Notice Requirements
Some courts have shown concern with the creditor's failure to afford his
guarantor notice of certain occurrences that may arise in common guaranty
transactions. Failure to give a guarantor notice when notice is required either
by the terms of the guaranty contract, the loan agreements, the common law,
or applicable statutory law67 can release the guarantor. 68 There are three
principal types of notice that may become pertinent to almost any guaranty
transaction: (1.) notice of acceptance, (2) notice of subsequent transactions, 69
and (3) notice of default or enforcement action against the principal debtor.
a. Notice of Acceptance
The requirement of notice of acceptance is consistent with the idea that a
contract of guaranty, like any other type of contract, requires a "meeting of the
minds," an agreement by both parties. Therefore, the courts have occasionally
considered the guarantor's execution of a guaranty to be an "offer," which
must be expressly "accepted" prior to its revocation by the proposed guaran-
tor. "Notice of intention to accept is notice to the guarantor by the creditor
that the latter intends to extend credit in reliance on the guaranty. Its purpose
is to enable the guarantor to plan his affairs intelligently. . . . Notice of in-
tention to accept... is necessarily contractual in theory."'70 This is not a
64. Most extensions of credit to which the particular creditor is party give rise to predictable
later modifications. The fairly detailed catalogue of credit requirements, any one or more of
which may be modified or waived during the course of a credit relationship, should provide a
ready source of examples which the contract of guaranty could specifically bring to the attention
of the guarantor.
65. Such alterations are normally requested in writing by the principal debtor and may, only
be accepted by the creditor in writing. When the written request for modification or waiver is
received by the creditor, a copy of the request could be sent to the guarantor with an accompany-
ing letter requiring the guarantor to object or consent to the alteration and to attach its (the guar-
antor's) signature to the request letter itself with the notation "approved" or "disapproved" above
the signature. That type of clear indication of the guarantor's response to a modification or waiver
request would likely be difficult evidence for a court to ignore.
66. It may very well be good practice for the creditor to apprise the guarantor of the debtor's
request even when the creditor has no intention of approving the request.
67. Most forms of guaranty and loan agreements prepared by creditors will contain no such
notice requirement. Certainly it is more likely that they will contain waivers of notice. For dis-
cussions of waiver of notice of acceptance, see Hickey Pipe & Supply Co. v. Fitzgerald, 3 Cal.
App. 2d 389, 39 P.2d 472 (1934); Wehle v. Baker, 97 Ga. App. 111, 102 S.E.2d 661 (1958); Gug-
genheimer & Co. v. Gilmore, 29 Ga. App. 540, 116 S.E. 67 (1923).
68. See generally 1 A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 68-69, at 283-87 (1963).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
70. Dole, Notice Requirements of Guaranty Contracts, 62 MICH. L. REv. 57, 59-60 (1963). In
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provocative area of the law.71 The rules are rather clear cut and readily lend
themselves to coherent analysis.
Notice of acceptance may be waived by the guarantor when he executes
the guaranty contract.72 If the guaranty is absolute in form, as when the form
is labelled "Absolute Guaranty" or merely recites in the text that it is an abso-
lute guaranty, the prevailing view provides that no notice of acceptance is nec-
essary.73 There is also statutory law to the same effect.74  A waiver of
acceptance is necessarily drafted into any guaranty form that contains a recita-
tion of the consideration flowing to the guarantor. A nominal consideration is
sufficient ("for good and valuable consideration") to evidence the mutual as-
sent, or "meeting of the minds.175 Mere delivery of the guaranty to the guar-
antor will suffice to form the contractual relationship. 76  In addition, and
consistent with commercial reality, acceptance often may be inferred: if, with
the guarantor's knowledge, the guaranty is received and relied upon by the
creditor, the acceptance requirement is satisfied. 77 Most often the guaranty
will be executed in response to the creditor's request and the principal contract
or loan agreement will be contemporaneous with the guaranty, in which case
no additional notice of acceptance is required.
78
It has been held that acceptance of a continuing guaranty7 9 at the time the
guaranty is originally offered does not obviate the need for notice of accept-
ance when the creditor negotiates subsequent advances or extensions of the
original indebtedness.80 The better view, however, provides that unless a
the typical transaction, the guarantor may be a principal of the debtor and is, in fact, well aware of
the creditor's "acceptance" of the guaranty. See also Campbell, The Notice Due to a Guarantor, 35
MICH. L. REv. 529 (1937); Rogers, Notice of Acceptance in Contracts of Guaran y, 5 COLUM. L.
Rav. 215 (1905).
71. See Dole, supra note 70, at 66, wherein the tension between the "condition precedent"
and the "condition subsequent" methods of acceptance analysis is disposed of as "indistinguish-
able apart from verbal formulation" (citing H. ARANT, SuRErYSHIP § 26, at 69 (1931)). See gener-
ally I S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 69A, at 219-22 (3d ed. 1957).
72. See Dole, supra note 70, at 67, and authority cited therein. It should be noted, however,
that acceptance itself is not waived by mere waiver of notice of acceptance. See also Guggen-
heimer & Co. v. Gilmore, 29 Ga. App. 540, 116 S.E. 67 (1923).
73. Wehle v. Baker, 97 Ga. App. 111, 102 S.E.2d 661 (1958); Motor Supply Co. v. Hunter,
251 Miss. 837, 171 So. 2d 870 (1965); Clear Fir Sales Co. v. Carolina Plywood Distrib., Inc., 13
N.C. App. 429, 185 S.E.2d 737 (1972); Cobb v. Texas Distrib., Inc., 524 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1975); Robey v. Walton Lumber Co., 17 Wash. 2d 242, 135 P.2d 95 (1943); In re Estate of
Mingesz, 70 Wis. 2d 734, 235 N.W.2d 296 (1975).
74. See the courts' consideration of applicable statutory law in Thorpe v. Story, 10 Cal. 2d
104, 117-18, 73'P.2d 1194, 1202 (1937); Abbott v. National Bank of Commerce, 176 Okla. 629, 630,
56 P.2d 886, 887 (1936); Burns v. Ferguson, 576 P.2d 784, 786 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977); Continental
Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 56 S.D. 410, 412, 228 N.W. 809, 810 (1930).
75. See Huckaby v. McConnon & Co., 213 Ala. 631, 634, 105 So. 886, 888 (1925); Barnett
Bank v. Marable, 385 So. 2d 66, 67 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Shur-Gain Feed Div., William Davies
Co. v. Huntsville Prod. Credit Ass'n, 372 So. 2d 1317, 1320 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979). See also John-
son v. Staenglen, 85 F. 603 (5th Cir. 1898).
76. See Angelo lafrate Co. v. Detroit & N. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 80 Mich. App. 508, 264
N.W.2d 45 (1978).
77. See Dole, supra note 70, at 76.
78. Rawleigh, Moses & Co. v. Kornberg, 210 F.2d 176, 182 (8th Cir. 1954); Eastman Oil Well
Survey Co. v. Hamil, 416 S.W.2d 597, 604-08 (rex. Civ. App. 1967).
79. See supra note 9.
80. See Security State Bank v. Gray, 224 Mo. App. 980, 25 S.W.2d 512 (1929).
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guarantor of future advances specifically requires notice of acceptance, such
notice is deemed to be waived.81 Also, if shown through a course of perform-
ance,82 course of dealing, or perhaps even usage of trade,83 that it is the credi-
tor's practice to accept guaranties from the guarantor, no notice of acceptance
is necessary.84
A Notice of Subsequent Transactions
This form of notice was suggested above in the discussion on modification
of contract terms,85 and even if it were not recognized as a "notice" require-
ment in all circumstances, a careful creditor should inform his guarantor of all
significant transactions between the creditor and the principal debtor. Credit
documentation routinely contains a clause providing the address to which no-
tices may be sent and some reasonable period of time after dispatch in the
United States mails8 6 by which delivery will be presumed.87 It is generally
assumed that the guarantor assents to the proposed transaction if he does not
object after receiving notice. In reality, however, no responsible creditor's at-
torney would counsel his client to rely on such an assumption. A form of
waiver or assent to the transaction 8 should be provided by the creditor, along
with a stamped, self-addressed envelope to accommodate immediate consent
to the transaction. If the consent is not returned within a reasonable period of
time, a telephone call should follow. Certainly this procedure is the safest.
81. See Swisher v. Deering, 204 Il. 202, 205-07, 68 N.E. 517, 518 (1903); Southdale Center
Inc. v. Lewis, 260 Minn. 430,439, 110 N.W.2d 857, 863 (1961); National Bank v. Security Elevator
Co., 161 Minn. 30, 41-42, 200 N.W. 851, 856 (1924).
82. UCC § 2-208 (1978) provides, in pertinent part:
Course of Performance or Practical Construction
(1)- Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by either
party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to
it by the other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection
shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement.
83. UCC § 1-205 (1978) provides, in pertinent part:
Course of Dealing and Usage of Trade
(1) A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a
particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of
understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct.
(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of
observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be ob-
served with respect to the transaction in question. The existence and scope of such a
usage are to be proved as facts. If it is established that such a usage is embodied in a
written trade code or similar writing the interpretation of the writing is for the court.
84. Swisher v. Deering, 204 IlL 203, 68 N.E. 517 (1903).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
86. A typical provision might read as follows:
Notice. Any notice hereunder shall be in writing, and shall be deemed to have been
validly served, given, or delivered five (5) calendar days following deposit in the U.S.
Mails, with proper postage prepaid and properly addressed to the party to be notified.
It is only reasonable that the creditor take into account postal and geographic realities when draft-
ing such a presumption.
87. Courts may be more willing to observe such a presumption if the notice provision or
creditor practice requires use of certified or registered maiL
88. The waiver should be made to appear as pedestrian as possible. In this circumstance it
wiould be appropriate to avoid the use of word processing. A pretyped form with obvious blanks
completed by hand might best achieve the effect intended.
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Some states89 may require that notice be given to the guarantor on a regu-
lar basis to keep the guarantor apprised of the balance due on the principal
debtor's account.90 Notice of any adjustment to payment terms is also a com-
mon form of subsequent transaction of which a guarantor should be apprised.
The justification for both of these notice requirements would also be the neces-
sity of enabling the guarantor to order his affairs 9 ' and the protection of the
guarantor's subrogation right.92 Although it would likely not be necessary to
receive the guarantor's approval of the balance due on the principal debtor's
account,93 if a creditor and debtor decide to adjust payment terms, the written
consent of the guarantor should be secured.
Contemporary authority suggests that notice is not necessary unless the
terms of the guaranty contract so provide.94 Nevertheless, because a recalci-
trant guarantor may be expected to grasp at any (even dubiously) available
straw to avoid liability altogether or at least to delay collection efforts, the
right to notice of subsequent transactions will be expressly waived in the form
of guaranty.95
c. Notice of Default
This aspect of notice requirements has been a focus of recent case law
development. Several courts have held that a creditor must notify the guaran-
tor of the existence of a default by the principal debtor and of the creditor's
89. See, e.g., Rapelye & Purdy v. Bailey, 3 Conn. 438 (1828) (guarantor must receive notice
prior to each extension ofcredit); Babcock v. Bryant, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 133 (183 1) (guarantor not
liable until after reasonable notice that goods have been delivered under the contract guaranteed).
Dole, supra note 70, at 85-86, suggests that the vitality of the rule is dubious because none of the
cases providing for notice of transactions has been recently reaffirmed (citing Campbell, supra
note 70, at 548). But see infra text accompanying notes 96-111.
90. In commercial finance and similar lending transactions strict enforcement of a notice of
subsequent transactions requirement would require that the guarantors be sent a copy of the peri-
odic statement that is sent to the principal debtor. While that procedure would not present a
particularly onerous burden to creditors, the cost would surely be passed on to the principal
debtor. Moreover, that cost would quite often be unjustified because guarantors are very often the
principals of the debtor or an affiliate or subsidiary of the principal debtor. See, e.g., Standard
Roller Bearing Co. v. Bergdoll, 214 F. 175 (E.D. Pa. 1914); Boyd & Rickets v. Snyder, 49 Md. 325
(1878); Gloucester Mut. Fishing Ins. Co. v. Boyer, 294 Mass. 35, 200 N.E. 557 (1936).
91. See supra text accompanying note 71.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 49-58.
93. Because most loans have a "cap"1 on the amount the debtor may borrow, and the guaran-
tor's potential liability will be up to that amount, there would seem to be little need to keep the
guarantor apprised of the balance due so long as the amount does not exceed the predetermined
ceiling. See also supra note 10.
94. See Dole, supra note 70, at 85-86; Campbell, supra note 70, at 548-50. See also RESTATE-
MENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 56 (1923); RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 86 (1937). Perhaps the
most convincing indication of the current attitude toward notice of subsequent transactions is the
lack of any case holding such notice necessary in the absence of a guaranty specifically so
providing.
95. One possible wording to achieve this effect would be:
Creditor is authorized, without notice or demand and without affecting the liability of
the Guarantor under this Guaranty, from time to time to (1) extend credit or advance
loans to principal debtor, (2) renew, extend, accelerate, or otherwise change the terms of
the Loan Agreement, (3) accept partial payment of the Liabilities, and (4) settle, release,
compromise, collect, or otherwise liquidate the Liabilities. Guarantor also waives all
notice of the existence, creation, or incurring of new or additional indebtedness or obli-
gations by the principal debtor under the Loan Agreement.
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intention to exercise rights against the debtor or against the collateral securing
the debt.96 The issue is made particularly interesting by part five of Article 9
of the UCC, which deals with the rights of parties to a secured loan when the
debtor is in default.97
Recent cases have equated a guarantor of secured debt to a secured
debtor, one who "owes payment or other performance of the obligation se-
cured." 98 Application of that conclusion has afforded such guarantors signifi-
cant protection. Nowhere has the sting of that reading of Article 9 been felt
more profoundly than under the notice requirements of the UCC. Section 9-
504(3) provides in pertinent part:
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in
value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reason-
96. That requirement may be difficult to fulfill when the principal debtor is frequently in
default (for technical rather than substantial reasons) and could pose practical problems in loan
administration. Again, the concerns expressed with regard to notice of transactions are apposite.
See supra note 90.
97. Part five of UCC Article 9 contains the provisions dealing with the parties' rights upon
default. While "default" is nowhere defined in the UCC, Professor Clark has catalogued four-
,teen events of default contained in typical loan and security agreements:
(1) Failure to make an installment payment when due;
(2) Failure to make payments on other obligations, whether or not cross-collateral-
ized, including overdrafts;
(3) Breach of warranty that the debtor is the owner of the collateral free of any other
encumbrance;
(4) The filing of any competing financing statement against the collateral, even though
it may be later,
(5) Failure of the debtor to defend the collateral against any competing claims;
(6) Sale of the collateral (except in ordinary course) without the creditor's prior writ-
ten consent;
(7) Failure to keep the collateral adequately insured, with a loss payable clause run-
ning in favor of the secured creditor and the right of the creditor to make up any
delinquent premiums and charge it to the unpaid debt;
(8) Failure to allow the creditor to inspect the collateral upon demand at any reason-
able time;
(9) Failure to make prompt payment of taxes on the collateral;
(10) Loss, theft, substantial damage, or destruction of the collateral, or the making of
any levy, attachment, or garnishment against it by a competitor,
(11) Failure of account debtors to pay their obligations in due course when accounts
receivable, executory contract rights, chattel paper, or instruments are involved,
even in non-notification financing;
(12) The debtor's death, dissolution, termination of existence, or insolvency (defined
broadly to include (a) liabilities exceeding assets and (b) inability to pay debts as
they come due);
(13) Assignment for the benefit of creditors, appointment of a receiver, or the com-
mencement of bankruptcy proceedings by or against the debtor, and
(14) Whenever the secured party 'in good faith believes that the prospect of payment,
performance or realization on the collateral is impaired.'
B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
4.2[1], at 4-5 (1980) (footnote omitted). The occurrence of default (13) would not be effective in
the bankruptcy setting because of the provisions of §§ 365(b), (e), and (0(3) of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(b), (e), (0(3) (Supp. V 1981). That circumstance should
not dissuade creditors from using the "ipso facto" or "bankruptcy" clauses altogether, however,
because such clauses are still effective outside the bankruptcy context.
98. UCC § 9-105(l)(d) (1978) defines "debtor," in part, as "the person who owes payment
or performance of the obligation secured, whether or not he owns or has rights in the collateral,
and includes the seller of accounts or chattel paper."
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able notification of the time and place of any public sale or reason-
able notification of the time after which any private sale or other
intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party
to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a statement renounc-
ing or modifying his right to notification of sale.99
In State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc. 100 the
Supreme Court of North Dakota held that in all situations in which a creditor
would be required by law to give notice of enforcement efforts to the principal
debtor, the creditor must also give such notice to the guarantor, notwithstand-
ing the guarantor's predefault express waiver of notice in the guaranty con-
tract. An Alabama court, in First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, NA. v.
Parsons,101 reached the same result. The court reasoned that because the un-
conditional guarantor would fit the definition of a "debtor" under the UCC
and because a guarantor would be liable for any deficiency after the sale of the
collateral, the guarantor-had a sufficient stake in the "commercially reason-
able"'10 2 disposition of the collateral to require that he be afforded the same
protections which the UCC assures the principal debtor. The court relied on a
New York decision to support its conclusion:
[tihe purpose of U.C.C. § 9-504(3) is to notify all persons having an
interest in the collateral so that they may protect their interests. No-
tice of sale allows those persons to safeguard any right of redemp-
tion, to bid at the sale, to procure other bidders, or otherwise insure
that a fair price is received for the collateral. Because a guarantor is
liable for any deficiency after sale, he has at least as much at stake in
a sale after default as the debtor does.' 03
Based on decisions such as the foregoing, it has been suggested that the clearly
discernible trend' °4 of recent authority extends Article 9 notice protections to
guarantors. 10 5
99. UCC § 9-504(3) (1978) (emphasis added): "Secured Party's Right to Dispose of Collat-
eral After Default; Effect of Disposition."
100. 289 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1980).
101. 390 So. 2d 640 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980).
102. UCC § 9-504(3) (1978). "The test of commercial reasonableness is essentially an objec-
tive standard, which incorporates much pre-Code law but changes old judicial decisions holding
that a sale in 'good faith' was sufficient." B. CLARK, supra note 97, 4.7, at 4-46. See Empire Life
Ins. Co. v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1972). See also S.M. Flickinger Co. v. 18 Genes-
see Corp., 71 A.D.2d 382, 423 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1979). See generally Annot., 59 A.L.R. 3D 369 (1974).
103. 390 So. 2d at 642 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980) (citing Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Natarelli,
93 Misc. 2d 78, -, 401 N.Y.S.2d 404, 412 (Sup. Ct. 1977)).
104. See Commercial Discount Corp. v. King, 515 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ill. 1981); First Ala.
Bank v. Parsons, 390 So. 2d 640 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Clune Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Sprangler,
615 S.W.2d 106 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Natarelli, 93 Misc. 2d 78,
401 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1977); State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub,
Inc., 289 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1980). See also Rushton v. Shea, 423 F. Supp. 468 (D. Del. 1976);
Barnett v. Barnett Bank, 345 So. 2d 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Bank of Gering v. Glover, 192
Neb. 575, 223 N.W.2d 56 (1974); Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Hurst, 570 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1977).
105. See Mack Fin. Corp. v. Scott, 100 Idaho 889, 606 P.2d 993 (1980). See generally Note,
supra note 12, at 84. That turn of events is particularly disturbing for creditors, because it is likely
that those rights which a debtor is not able to waive prior to default will, in turn, not be waivable
by the guarantors at the time they execute the contract of guaranty.
Section 9-501(3)(a) to (e) of the UCC:
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Rather than abandon all hope, however, creditors would be well-advised
to argue along the lines suggested by the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York in American Express International Banking Corp. V.
Sabet.106 The district court distinguished those cases in which "[t]he term
'debtor' has been construed to extend beyond the owner of the collateral to a
non-owner obligor such as a guarantor or other party with a right of recourse
against the collateral, or claim for contribution or reimbursement .... ,"107 If
the right to subrogation has been waived by the guarantor (which is a standard
guaranty form provision)'0 8 the creditor may successfully argue that the rea-
soning of the cases construing a section 9-105(l)(d) "debtor" to include a guar-
antor is effectively undermined. The Sabel court found that once the right of
recourse against the collateral through subrogation, contribution, or reim-
bursement is avoided, it "makes little commercial sense" to afford the guaran-
tor the protection of section 9-504(3).109 While that analysis is not
prevent[s] the debtor from waiving certain important rights before default: (1) the right
to require disposition of the collateral on default, (2) the right to notification of sale of
the collateral, (3) the right to require that every aspect of the sale be commercially rea-
sonable, (4) the right to surplus proceeds, (5) the right to redeem the collateral before the
secured party has disposed of it, contracted to dispose of it, or agreed to accept it in
satisfaction of the debt, and (6) the right to hold the secured party liable for damages,
including minimum statutory damages as provided in Section 9-507.
R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 505 (1977) (em-
phasis in original).
But decisions such as that of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois in National Acceptance Co. of Am. v. Wechsler, 489 F. Supp. 642 (N.D. Ill. 1980), confirm
that there is a well-reasoned minority view to the contrary:
mhe Court does not believe that a guarantor's status as a debtor under section 9-504(3)
compels the conclusion that a guarantor may not waive the rights accorded thereunder.
First, it should be observed that the collateral in question is not owned by the guarantor.
Thus, while it may be unconscionable to permit a secured party... to dispose unrea-
sonably of a debtor's property, the same cannot be said as to a guarantor, who by defini-
tion has a lesser interest in that collateral. Second, the Court must consider the general
purpose of guaranty agreements. Such agreements facilitate the issuance of loans by
ensuring that the lender has a ready source from which it can collect in the event of
default by the debtor. To this end, it would not be unusual for a lender to require a
guarantor to waive objections to payment that otherwise might be available. The Court
does not believe that section 9-501(3) was intended to preclude such agreements.
489 F. Supp. at 647-48. See also Vickers v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 158 Ga. App. 434, 280 S.E,2d
842 (1981) (a guarantor may assert that collateral was not disposed of in a commercially reason-
able manner, but that does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a guarantor is a "debtor"
entitled to notice of disposition of collateral); Commercial Discount Corp. v. Bayer, 57 11. App. 3d
295, 298, 372 N.E.2d 926, 929 (1978) (suggesting that a guarantor could waive rights that the
principal debtor could not waive under part five of Article 9 of the UCC).
106. 512 F. Supp. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
107. Id at 470-71 (citing Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Natarelli, 93 Misc. 2d 78, 401
N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Northern Fin. Corp. v. Chatwood Coffee Shop, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.(Callaghan) 674 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967)).
108. A typical provision might read as follows:
Until the Liabilities shall have been paid in full, the Guarantor hereunder shall have no
right of subrogation or contribution and hereby waives the right to enforce any remedy
which the Creditor now has or hereafter may acquire against the principal debtor or any
other guarantor of the Liabilities.
109. 512 F. Supp. at 471.
110. In First Ala. Bank v. Parsons, 390 So. 2d 640 (Ala. Civ.App. 1980), the court found that a
guarantor requires the protection of UCC § 9-504(3) (1978) "[b]ecause a guarantor is liable for
any deficiency after sale [of the collateral]." 390 So. 2d at 642. In the face of that type of analysis,
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unassailable," 10 the District Court for the Southern District of New York is
too well-respected a commercial tribunal for creditors' counsel to ignore when
trying to enforce a guaranty contract."'
C. Winning the Battle of the Forms
In light of the very apparent judicial preference for guarantors, creditors
are often left with the impression that there is precious little they can to to
safeguard their rights vis-A-vis guarantors. Contract-drafting limitations
notwithstanding," 2 the cases have provided some support for the idea that a
scrupulously composed contract of guaranty may withstand the attack of even
the most pitiable guarantor.
A 1976 decision of an Illinois appellate court, Jacobson v. Devon Bank, 113
considered a form of guaranty that provided:
The liability hereunder shall in no wise be affected or impaired by
(and said Bank is hereby expressly authorized to make from time to
time, without notice to anyone) any sale, pledge, surrender, compro-
mise, release, renewal, extension, indulgence, alteration, exchange,
change in, or modification of any said indebtedness, liabilities and
obligations, either expressed or implied or any contract or contracts
evidencing any thereof, or any security or collateral therefor.'14
The guarantor notified the creditor that he was no longer associated with the
principal debtor and would not be-party to any new guaranties in connection
with renewals and extensions of the original debt. After that notification, the
debtor and creditor agreed to subsequent renewals and extensions of the origi-
nal debt. In due course the debtor defaulted.
After acknowledging the general rule "'that guaranty agreements are to
be strictly construed in favor of the guarantor'. . . and 'the liability of a guar-
antor cannot be extended by construction,' ,'n5 the court concluded that the
scope of the language in the guaranty could not be overcome. Judge Goldberg
was unable "to conceive of a broader or more inclusive form of guaranty."" 16
There was absolutely no limitation on the exposure of the guarantor for the
court to construe'17
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma reached a similarly sensible result in
the argument suggested here by reference to Sabet would probably not save the day for the
creditor.
11. See Note, supra note 12, at 85 (citing 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY 304 (1965); McNulty v. Codd, 157 Ga. App. 8,276 S.E.2d 73 (1981), in which the court
concluded without qualification that a guarantor is not entitled to notice of disposition of collat-
eral because the Code nowhere provides that such notice be afforded a guarantor (citing Brinson
v. Commercial Bank, 138 Ga. App. 177, 225 S.E.2d 701 (1976)).
112. See supra note 105 and authorities cited therein.
113. 39 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 351 N.E.2d 254 (1976).
114. Id at 1054, 351 N.E.2d at 255.
115. Id See also King Korn Stamp Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 114 M1. App. 2d 428,
252 N.E.2d 734 (1969).
116. Jacobson v. Devon Bank, 39 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 1056, 351 N.E.2d 254, 256 (1976).
117. See also Application of Bickel, 14 IlI. App. 3d 813, 303 N.E.2d 541 (1973); Claude S.
Corp. v. Henry's Drive-In, Inc., 51 Ill. App. 2d 289, 201 N.E.2d 127 (1964).
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Riverside National Bank v. Manolakis,118 but went a step further in its protec-
tion of creditors. The guaranty contract provided that the guarantor's "liabil-
ity would not be 'affected or impaired' by any 'failure, neglect or omission' of
the bank to protect, in any manner, the collection of the indebtedness or the
security given therefor."' 19 The Oklahoma statute under consideration by the
court in Manolakis provided that if a mortgagee failed to seek a deficiency
judgment within ninety days after the foreclosure sale, the principal debtor's
obligation would be absolutely terminated.120 The court had previously de-
cided in Apache Lanes, Inc. v. National Educators Life Insurance Co. 121 that
the protection afforded by that statute extended to guarantors of the mortgage
debt as well.122 At issue in Manolakis was whether the form of unconditional
guaranty could effectively deprive the guarantor of the statutory protection
afforded him *by the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Apache Lanes.
Justice Opala recognized that the creditor's decision to pursue or not to
pursue a deficiency claim could affect the guarantor's subrogation right.' 23
But he refused to-go so far as.necessarily to discharge a guarantor whenever
the statute discharged the principal debtor:
[The discharge or nondischarge of the guarantor] must, of course,
depend on the nature of the guarantor's undertaking. GivingApache
the meaning for which the guarantor contends would make legally
impermissible and hence unenforceable any guarantor's promise that
is broad enough to survive § 686 discharge of the principal debtor.
There is no statutory warrant for so restricting the creditor's power to
exact a broader promise and the guarantor's capacity to bargain
away his § 344124 defenses. In short, the protection of § 686 applies
only to debtors. It does not make illegal those contracts that allow
the guarantor's liability to survive § 686 discharge nor can it,per se,
operate to exonerate the guarantor from liability on an obligation
deemed "satisfied" by that section.125
118. 613 P.2d 438 (Okla. 1980).
119. d at 442.
120. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 686 (1971) provides, in pertinent part:
In actions to enforce a mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien or charge, a personal judg-
ment or judgment.. . shall be rendered for the amount or amounts due.. . . Notwith-
standing the above provisions no judgment shall be enforced for any residue of the debt
remaining unsatisfied as prescribed by this Act after the mortgaged property shall have
been sold, except as herein provided. Simultaneously with the making of a motion for
an order confirming the sale or in any event within ninety days after the date of the sale,
the party to whom such residue shall be owing may make a motion in the action for
leave to enter a deficiency judgment upon notice to the party against whom such judg-
ment is sought. . . . If no motion for a deficiency judgment shall be made. . . the
proceeds of the sale regardless of amount shall be deemed to be in full satisfaction of the
mortgage debt and no right to recover any deficiency in any action or proceeding shall
exist.
121. 529 P.2d 984 (Okla. 1974).
122. Manolakis, 613 P.2d at 441.
123. Id See also supra text accompanying notes 96-111.
124. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 344 (1971) provides that "[a] guarantor is not exonerated by the
discharge of his principal by operation of law, without the intervention or omission of the
creditor."
125. 613 P.2d at 441 (footnote added).
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That language maintains the essential distinction between the creditor-debtor
and the creditor-guarantor relationships, and should encourage lenders not to
forsake the contract of guaranty despite the fact that even the most complete
forms have not always passed muster. Succinctly, if perhaps inelegantly, the
result in Manolakis suggests that the baby should not be thrown out with the
bath water. 126
A recent decision of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Commercial Discount Corp. v. King,127 also required that
the guarantor remain bound by the contract of guaranty he had signed. In a
memorandum opinion, Judge Shadur considered the guarantor's interposition
of seven separate defenses and had little difficulty finding each of them ineffec-
tive to preclude enforcement of the "continuing, absolute and unconditional
guaranty."'128 Each of defendant guarantor's affirmative defenses ran directly
counter to the clear language of the form of guaranty.
In response to the guarantor's complaint that the creditor exceeded credit
limits authorized under the Loan and Security Agreement, the court's opinion
cited the express terms of the guaranty to the effect that such overadvances,
even without notice to the guarantor, would "in no way affect or impair" the
enforcement of the guaranty. 129 The guarantor also asserted that the guaranty
had been terminated, and raised questions about the application of payments
the creditor received after the alleged termination date. That defense was also
summarily dismissed by reference to the terms of the guaranty. 130 Defenses
premised on the creditor's alleged "control ' 131 of the debtor, the effect of the
debtor's bankruptcy, 132 and the creditor's alleged failure to join other guaran-
tors and to deal properly with the collateral securing the principal debtor's
obligation, merited, in the language of the opinion, "short shrift." 13 3
Judge Shadur's opinion is particularly valuable to creditors because the
guarantor in that case was not particularly sophisticated. He was an individ-
ual who argued that "as a nonprofessional guarantor he [was] entitled to strict
construction of the documents in his favor."' 134 The court refused to permit
126. See also supra note 105.
127. Commercial Discount Corp. v. King, No. 78-C-3442 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 1980), vacated in
part, 515 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
128. Id, slip op. at 3 (quoting the express language of the guaranty). The court appended the
very complete form of guaranty to its opinion.
129. Id at 2 (quoting the express language of the guaranty). The contract of guaranty pro-
vided, in pertinent part:
This guaranty shall be a continuing, absolute and unconditional guaranty, and shall re-
main in full force and effect until written notice of its discontinuance shall be actually
received by CDC, and also until any and all of said indebtedness, obligations and liabili-
ties before receipt of such notice shall be fully paid.
No. 78-C-3442, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Ill Sept. 23, 1980).
130. Id
131. Id The court again referred specifically to the language quoted supra note 129. See also
Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resultingfrom Improper Interference with the Management
ofa Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. LAW. 343 (1975).
132. No. 78-C-3442, slip op. at 3-4.
133. Id at 5.
134. Id at 2.
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that reasoning to preclude the enforcement of the "unequivocal and unambig-
uous terms" 135 of the form contract of guaranty.136
Two recent appellate decisions in North Carolina have upheld the strict
language of the guaranty contracts notwithstanding the objection of the guar-
antors. In Love v. Bache & Co. 137 the North Carolina Court of Appeals recog-
nized that guaranties are governed by contract principles, and cited
encyclopedic authority for the proposition that "[a] guarantor is bound by an
agreement in the guaranty contract which permits extensions of time ....
[A]n extension of time within the intent of the agreement does not discharge
the guarantor." 138 In Cities Service Oil Co. v. Howell Oil Co. 139 the court had
previously noted that the law of the state is well-settled: "[t]he rights of the
plaintiff as against the guarantors, defendants herein, arise out of the guaranty
contract and must be based on that contract." 140 Both Love and Cities Service
are encouraging for creditors because the guarantors did not enjoy a strong
negotiating posture vis-A-vis the creditor. Nevertheless, the appellate panels
upheld the strict language of the guaranty contracts.' 41
II. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
On October 1, 1979, the Bankruptcy Reform Act (Bankruptcy Code)
came into effect replacing the prior Bankruptcy Act, which had been the effec-
tive federal insolvency law for over fifty years.142 Like its predecessor, the
135. Id In a subsequent decision, Commercial Discount Corp. v. King, 515 F. Supp. 988
(N.D. Ill. 1981), portions of the memorandum opinion were vacated in light of events occurring
after the creditor's motion for summary judgment was fully briefed. That turn of events, however,
should not compromise the legal analysis of Judge Shadur's original memorandum opinion. The
later developments dealt with issues of notice of sale of collateral due a guarantor. See supra text
accompanying notes 96-11. For an example of a court's construing a contract of guaranty in the
light most favorable to the creditor, see Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fagan, 674 F.2d 302 (4th
Cir. 1982). In Fagan the court of appeals held that a guarantor who assumed liability for "all
debts and obligations of the Borrower" was liable for reasonable attorney's fees of the creditor,
because the note executed by the debtor included payment of reasonable attorney's fees as an
obligation of the debtor.
136. Judge Wisdom, in a 1981 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, held that
notwithstanding the guarantors' equitable defenses, the application of funds language in the guar-
anty contract was absolutely binding on the guarantors. "The guarantors, therefore, have contrac-
tually waived any equitable right they might otherwise have had to control the order of
application." Bob Maxfield, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 637 F.2d 1033, 1041 (5th Cir. 1981).
See also Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Kellum, 641 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1981) (guarantor's prior
consent to modifications precluded guarantor from objecting to subsequent alteration of creditor-
principal debtor agreement).
137. 40 N.C. App. 617, 253 S.E.2d 351 (1981).
138. Id at 619, 253 S.E.2d at 353 (citing 38 AM. JUR. 2D Guaranty § 94, at 1100 (1968)).
139. 34 N.C. App. 295, 237 S.E.2d 921 (1977).
140. Id at 299, 237 S.E.2d at 924 (citing EAC Credit Corp. v. Wilson, 281 N.C. 140, 145, 187
S.E.2d 752, 755 (1972)).
141. See also North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Corbett, 271 N.C. 444, 156 S.E.2d 835 (1967)
(creditor's failure to insert limitation of guarantor's liability in space provided did not preclude
enforcement of unlimited guaranty).
142. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 100-1326 (Supp. V 1981), represents
the first major revision of federal insolvency law in the last fifty years. In Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84
Stat. 468, effective July 24, 1970, Congress formed the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States. The Commission concluded its work on July 30, 1973, and Congressman Edwards
introduced the draft statute on January 4, 1977. The Bankruptcy Reform Act became law on
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Bankruptcy Code directly provides a federal fraudulent conveyance law and
indirectly incorporates state fraudulent conveyance law through a "strong
arm" provision.143 The applicable federal law is found in section 548:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor
in property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made
or incurred on or within one year before the date of the filing of the
petition, if the debtor-
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual in-
tent to hinder, delay or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or
became, on or after the date that such transfer occurred or such obli-
gation was incurred, indebted; or
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for such transfer or obligation; and
(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such
transfer or obligation;
(ii) was engaged in business, or was about to engage in business or
a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was
an unreasonably small capital; or
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur,
debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts
matured.144
A guaranty is clearly an "obligation incurred," and granting a security interest
in personal property or a mortgage or deed of trust interest in real property to
collateralize the guaranty would constitute a "transfer" for purposes of section
548.
Professor Rosenberg, in an article construing the intended application of
the prior fraudulent conveyance law to contracts of guaranty,145 identified
three types of guaranty contract: (1) the "downstream" guaranty; (2) the "up-
stream" guaranty; and (3) the "cross-stream" guaranty. 146 When a parent cor-
poration guaranties the indebtedness of its subsidiary, the parent is a
downstream guarantor. Such an arrangement normally poses no fraudulent
November 6, 1978. The Commission sought to curb the increasing inadequacies of the prior law
in four major areas: (1) the lack of useful reorganizational tools, which resulted in an increasing
number of straight bankruptcies (liquidation); (2) the mounting administrative cost occasioned by
delays in the system; (3) the lack of uniformity throughout the bankruptcy system; and (4) the lack
of adequate protection of respective creditor and debtor interests. COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY
LAWS OF THE UNImT STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 595, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1973).
143. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (Supp. V 1981) provides:
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any obliga-
tion incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding
an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title or that is not allowa-
ble only under section 502(e) of this title.
The chief significance of the incorporation of state law into the Bankruptcy Code is the extension
of the federal one year statute of limitations period to as much as five years in some states.
144. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (Supp. V 1981). Section 67(d) of the prior law governed fraudulent con-
veyances. I1 U.S.C. § 67(d) (1976).
145. Rosenberg, Intercorporate Guaranties and the Law of Fraudulent Conveyances: Lender Be-
ware, 125 U. PA. L. Rav. 235 (1976).
146. Id at 238.
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conveyance problems because the guarantor is receiving legally adequate con-
sideration. The parent is an "investor" in the subsidiary and the extension of
loan proceeds to the subsidiary, which is facilitated by the guaranty, "protects
the integrity and value of the principal's [parent's] investment."' 147 The credi-
tors of the parent, then, cannot complain, because by protecting the value of its
asset (the subsidiary), the parent "helps to assure repayment of the principal's
[parent's] direct creditors."' 48 Only upstream and cross-stream guaranties
may give rise to fraudulent conveyance problems: in those contexts the credi-
tors of the guarantor have their positions compromised in favor of the credi-
tors of the principal debtor, an entity whose financial welfare could not inure
to their benefit. 149
Thanks to the eternal vigilance of bankruptcy trustees, there is little doubt
that cases will arise to question the scope of the language of subsection
548(a)(1), "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud." But of primary concern
to lenders should be subsection 548(a)(2), which provides that taking a guar-
anty is a fraudulent conveyance if "less than a reasonably equivalent value" is
given in exchange for the guaranty and the guarantor is rendered "insolvent"
thereby. In an upstream guaranty situation, in which the subsidiary guaran-
tees the obligation of the holding company, it is difficult to see what value, if
any, is received by the guarantor. It is not at all clear that the fiscal well-being
of the parent directly benefits the subsidiary to the same extent that incurring
the guaranty obligation diminishes the subsidiary. Hence, "reasonably
equivalent value" may be lacking.
The guarantor's failure to receive "reasonably equivalent value" for the
guaranty obligation incurred does not alone subject the guaranty contract to
avoidance by the debtor's representative in bankruptcy.15° It must also be
147. Id
148. Id
149. The author describes the commercial role of "upstream" and "cross-stream" guaranties
as follows:
Typical circumstances in which a lender will require "upstream" guaranties are
those in which its lending relationship is with a holding company and the bulk of the
assets upon which the lender bases its credit judgment are distributed among the holding
company's subsidiaries. In order to be in a position in which it reasonably can anticipate
repayment out of the liquidation of those assets, the lender will require the subsidiaries
to guaranty the obligation of the holding company and will frequently require that the
guaranty of each subsidiary be secured by a security interest in its assets ...
Id at 238 n.3.
The "cross-stream" guaranty is indicated in the case in which two or more corporations
are wholly owned by the same principals, particularly where they are involved m related
activities and share a common destiny. Thus, for example, when one entity owns the
land and plant from which the operations of another are conducted and both are owned
by the same person or persons, a cautious lender will require that the nonborrowing
affiliate guaranty the obligation with a security interest in, or lien on, the assets of the
guarantor.
Id at 238-39 n.4.
150. In a Chapter XI proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor may remain in pos-
session during the reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (Supp. V 1981). Therefore, references to
the bankruptcy trustee in Chapter XI proceedings are to be read as referring to either a trustee or a
debtor in possession.
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shown that the debtor at the time of the guaranty's execution' 51 was insolvent,
or would be rendered insolvent as a result of the guaranty, or would be left
with "an unreasonably small capital," or intended to incur debts that the
debtor would be unable to pay at maturity.152 The Bankruptcy Code defines
"insolvency" in section 101(26) as "financial condition such that the sum of
the entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at a fair
valuation."153
Creditors' counsel will suggest that every guaranty obligation is necessar-
ily balanced by a concomitant asset: the subrogation right against the princi-
pal debtor. Also, when multiple parties guaranty an obligation, each of the
guarantors has a right of contribution from the other guarantors. 154 Professor
Rosenberg has suggested, however:
Some conceptual problems are presented in this approach. The no-
tion that the guaranty of a solvent obligor is offset by a contingent
asset based on the right of subrogation is simply not realistic; when
and if the guarantor is called upon to perform, the value of that con-
tingent asset in all likelihood would be discounted severely because it
probably would be no longer collectible. Otherwise, the guarantor
would not have been called upon to perform. 155
The commentator offered no authority supporting that view, and, in fact, cited
authority which holds to the contrary. 156 A subsequent case has held that con-
tingent subrogation and contribution rights are valuable assets, at least so far
as the fraudulent conveyance analysis is concerned. In In re 0/lag Construc-
tion Equipment Corp. 157 the Second Circuit considered the situation of Ollag,
a corporation with physical assets valued at about $140,000.158 The corpora-
tion's only significant liabilities were its contingent obligations as a guarantor
of the debt of its parent corporation. The panel found that those liabilities
"were tied to certain intangible assets. . . . Ollag had a right of subrogation
to recover against [the principal debtor] on the [creditor's] claims. Moreover,
Ollag could demand contribution from the co-guarantors."' 159 The court made
no reference to Professor Rosenberg's commentary, but clearly rejected his
151. See 11 U.S.C. § 67d(5). See also Rosenberg, supra note 145, at 252.
152. See UCC § 1-201(23) (1978), which defines an "insolvent" as an entity that "either has
ceased to pay [its] debts in the ordinary course of business or cannot pay [its] debts as they become
due or is insolvent within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law."
153. 11 U.S.C. § 101(26) (Supp. V 1981).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
155. Rosenberg, supra note 145, at 256 (emphasis added).
156. See In re Bowers, 215 F. 617, 618 (N.D. Ga. 1914), in which the court reasoned that:
the liability of a person as a surety or indorser, if the principal is solvent and abundantly
able to pay, is not such a liability as could be counted against him on the question of his
solvency or insolvency, because, if called on to pay such debt, he would immediately
have an asset which would be equal to the amount he would be required to pay.
See also Wingert v. Hagerstown Bank, 41 F.2d 660 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 871 (1930).
157. 578 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1978).
158. Id at 908 n.12.
159. Id at 908. The court found the bankruptcy judge's holding that the subrogation and
contribution rights were "worth little" to be clearly erroneous. Id
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analysis. 160
It may very well be that the right of subrogation or contribution would be
of insignificant value in the case of some guaranties. When the language of
Professor Rosenberg's conclusion is considered,' 6' it seems that his analysis
has some validity when applied to guaranties of collection, 162 in which the
guarantor is called upon to perform only after the creditor's collection efforts
have proved unavailing. 163 In the case of guaranties of payment, however, the
form of guaranty typically required by creditors, the commentator's analysis
breaks down and is clearly contrary to case law. Nevertheless, prudent credi-
tors should not rely on a bankruptcy court's following the analysis suggested
in Ollag.164 In a multicorporation setting, a creditor will always insist upon
the related corporation's providing "consolidating,"' 165 rather than merely
"consolidated,"' 16 6 financial statements. Creditors with significant leverage
may be able to require their debtors to adjust their corporate structure, for
example through merger, to avoid taking what may ultimately be character-
ized as an "upstream" guaranty.
The shortcomings of Professor Rosenberg's analysis and the soundness of
the Second Circuit's opinion in Ollag have been recognized by a creditor's
attorney, William Coquillette. 167 Coquillette considered the fate of upstream
guaranties under state law, particularly in those states that have adopted the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act (UFCA). In the course of some very
cogent treatment of the value of subrogation and contribution rights in the
context of the contingent liability represented by a guaranty, Coquillette sug-
gested that there is no significant distinction between the treatment of up-
160. See also Schwartz v. Comm'r, 560 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1977); Syracuse Eng'g Co. v. Haight,
97 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1938); Updike v. Oakland Motor Car Co., 53 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1931); Wing-
ert v. Hagerstown Bank, 41 F.2d 660 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 871 (1930); First Nat'l Bank
v. Jefferson Sales & Distrib., Inc., 341 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Miss. 1971), aff'dper cur/am, 460 F.2d
1059 (5th Cir. 1972).
161. See language emphasized supra text accompanying note 155.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 16-22.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
164. A recent bankruptcy court decision, however, has cited the Olag decision with approval
and valued subrogation and contribution rights as counterbalances to the contingent liability rep-
resented by a guaranty contract. See In re Hemphill, 18 Bankr. 38 (S.D. Iowa 1982).
165. "Consolidating" financial statements reveal the separate and distinct financial profile of
each of the related corporate entities.
166. "Consolidated" financial statements are:
balance sheets, income statements, and statements of changes in financial position of a
parent company and its subsidiaries, lumped together as though they were a single com-
pany with one or more divisions or branches. The grouping of all financial matters ig-
nores legal entities. The purpose is to make the communication of financial results to
shareholders and creditors meaningful by eliminating intercompany receivables, pay-
ables, investments, income, losses, and expenses. The parent company must have a con-
trolling interest-defined as a majority voting interest either directly or indirectly-in the
subsidiary in order for consolidation to be required.
I. KELLOGG, How To USE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS §§ 1.38-1.41 (2d ed. 1979). Kellogg warns
that any analysis of parent-subsidiary financial statements must take into account the "potential
for manipulation between the two entities." Id
167. Coquillette, supra note 13. Coquillette is associated with the firm of Jones, Day, Reavis
& Pogue, in its Cleveland office.
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stream guaranties under the UFCA and their treatment under the Bankruptcy
Code. He asserted the equivalence of the two statutes with regard to their
definition of "insolvency" in order to extend the reasoning of the Ollag deci-
sion, a bankruptcy case, to state fraudulent conveyance actions under the
UFCA:
Instead of referring to "present fair salable value" of assets, the
Bankruptcy Act referred to a "fair valuation of the aggregate of [its]
property." This difference should not preclude application of the 01-
lag holding in the context of the UFCA. Although the concept of
salability was not expressed in the Bankruptcy Act definition, it was
necessarily implied in the concept of "a fair valuation."
1 68
The commentator is correct, but he does not go far enough. By failing to
distinguish between "present fair salable value" (UFCA) and "fair valuation"
(Bankruptcy Code), Coquillette overlooked what may constitute a strong ar-
gument for the creditor resisting a trustee's fraudulent conveyance attack. The
phrase "present fair salable value" has been construed as a liquidation value
standard:
Before an asset is counted, it must have a market value, measured by
a willing seller and a willing buyer, and it must be subject to liquida-
tion within a reasonably immediate period of time. Thus, if an asset
can be converted to cash only in the future, it will not be included on
the asset side.169
Commenting upon that liquidation value appraisal, Coquillette acknowledged
that "[a]ssets which are very valuable to the corporation in its business but
which are hard to sell present a problem, and some courts would have such
assets excluded from the calculation." 170 It appears, then, that to equate the
"fair valuation" standard of bankruptcy law with the UFCA insolvency stan-
dard suggests that "fair valuation" means mere liquidation value.
A creditor asserting that his guarantor was solvent at the time the guar-
anty was executed may very well argue that the guarantor's assets should be
valued as of that date on a basis similar to a "going-concern" value rather than
on a liquidation value basis. There is authority to support just such an argu-
ment. In discussing "value" in the context of a Chapter X117 1 proceeding
under the Bankruptcy Act, Judge Cyr determined in In re American Kitchen
168. Id at 457.
169. Rosenberg, supra note 145, at 254-55. But see Duncan v. Landis, 106 F. 839, 859 (3d Cir.
1901) ("A man's property, at a fair valuation, may amount to sufficient to pay his debts although
he might not be able to realize at once the amount of that valuation."); Tumarkin v. Gallay, 127 F.
Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (balance sheet standard).
170. Coquillette, supra note 13, at 455. See also Glenmore Distilleries Co. v. Seideman, 267 F.
Supp. 915 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
171. Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act provided for business reorganizations. The following
discussion of value is particularly apposite to fraudulent conveyance analysis because the assets of
a business not yet in bankruptcy (at the time of the conveyance) should certainly be as entitled to
the "going-concern" valuation suggested as those of a business already in a Chapter XI
proceeding.
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Foods, Inc. 172 that the value obtainable through a "commercially reasonably
disposition" of the assets was the appropriate construction of the Act's concept
of "value."' 173 It has been suggested that "Judge Cyr's consistent use of a stan-
dard shaped by the commercial realities at each stage of the proceeding and
the use of a standard approaching full going-concern value. . . may well in-
fluence decisions of courts operating under the Code."174 Creditors defending
an upstream or cross-stream guaranty in a Chapter 11 proceeding 175 should
assert Judge Cyr's valuation analysis in order to establish the solvency of the
guarantor at the time the guaranty was executed. A recent bankruptcy court
decision176 has acknowledged that "[u]nless a business is on its deathbed...
the 'fair value' of its assets, within the meaning and purview of 547(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code, 17 7 is the going concern value or fair market price.' 178
Finally, when considering the potential fraudulent conveyance ramifica-
tions of guaranties taken from an "insolvent" guarantor, the commentators
have apparently ignored section 548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. That section
provides that if the trustee does set aside a transaction (such as a grant of a
security interest to collateralize a guaranty) as fraudulent, the creditor may
retain a lien against the property transferred to the extent of any value given
by the creditor "in good faith."' 179 In order to attempt to establish that "good
faith," a creditor may require an "Affidavit of Solvency"' 80 from one or more
172. 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 715 (N.D. Me. 1976). See also In re Pembroke Manor Apts.,
547 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1977); In re Blazon Flexible Flyer, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
173. 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. at 720-21. Section 548(d)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code defines
"value" as "property, or satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but
does not include an unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the
debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1981). That definition, however, is inapposite for the
purposes of determining a valuation standard.
174. ILLINOIS INST. OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978, at 11-8 (1980). Judge Cyr was speaking to the issue of
adequate protection (now codified at I I U.S.C. § 362(d) (Supp. V 1981)) but his analysis is also
useful beyond that discrete subject area.
175. Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is titled "Reorganization." It would seem that Judge
Cyr's analysis could also be applied to Chapter 7 "Liquidation" proceedings, because the nature
of the debtor at the time of the allegedly fraudulent conveyance is the same whether relief is
ultimately sought under Chapter 7 or II.
176. In re Utility Stationery Stores, Inc., 12 Bankr. 170 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
177. 12 Bankr. at 176 (Section 547 is concerned with "Preferences").
178. Id (citing Langham, Langstrom & Burnett v. Blachard, 246 F.2d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 1957);
In re Fred D. Jones Co., 268 F. 818, 819 (7th Cir. 1920); In re Windsor Indus. Inc., 459 F. Supp.
270, 276 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
179. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (Supp. V 1981) provides:
Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation voidable under this section is void-
able under section 544, 545, or 547 of this title, a transferee or obligee of such a transfer
or obligation that takes for value and in good faith has a lien on any interest transferred,
may retain any lien transferred, or may enforce any obligation incurred, as the case may
be to the extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor in exchange for
such transfer or obligation.
The last clause of that section may cause creditors some difficulty because the party attacking the
conveyance as fraudulent will argue that the creditor in fact gave no value to the debtor. "Value"
in subsection (c), however, may be read as distinct from the "reasonably equivalent value" in
subsection (a)(2)(A). That standard could be easier for the creditor to satisfy.
180. These affidavits are sometimes referred to as "Guaranties of Validity."
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of the principals of the guarantor corporation.1 8 1 While by no means fail-safe,
the document requires the principal's attestation to the solvency of the corpo-
rate guarantor. The self-serving purpose of the form is transparent, but that
should not necessarily .compromise its effectiveness.
The affidavit has value beyond the fraudulent conveyance context. It typ-
ically provides that the affiant will assist the creditor in liquidating the collat-
eral at a specified rate of salary 82 for a specified period of time. 183 The
creditor is not, of course, obligated to retain the affiant in its employ but is
given the option of doing so. In any event, such an option is not worthwhile
(in other words, not "cost-effective") if the creditor must initiate litigation to
enforce it. Many responsible affiants will, however, feel a moral obligation to
fulfill the terms of the affidavit.184 Nevertheless, it would be neither overly
zealous nor entirely inappropriate to take a personal guaranty as well as an
Affidavit of Solvency from the principal, if the structure of the transaction
allows.
III. CONCLUSION
Many of the cases applying common law and statutory provisions have
displayed a substantial bias in favor of the interests of those who contract to
answer for the debt of another. The (perhaps unfortunate) creditor who has
relied, presumably in good faith, on the enforceability of the guaranty obliga-
tion has often been the victim of arguably ill-reasoned proguarantor decisions.
While many of the defenses to guaranty liability are founded on cogent and
equitable legal reasoning, the courts' inconsistencies have hampered the integ-
rity of credit documentation. Nevertheless, reports of the demise of the guar-
anty contract are exaggerated. Through careful and complete documentation
combined with scrupulous attention to the rights of the guarantor, creditors
may place significant stock in the efficacy of the guaranty. The persuasive
legal arguments presented in this article are available to lenders' counsel. By
implementing these suggestions, creditors' attorneys may even be able to steer
a careful course between the Scylla and Charybdis of fraudulent conveyance
and UCC protections that guarantors are wont to assert in order to avoid
liability.
181. The affidavits may or may not be taken in lieu of a personal guaranty from the debtor's
principal. Corporate principals often refuse to sign a guaranty when a creditor drafts it to provide
a collateral interest in the principal's primary residence.
182. This rate of salary is usually based on the rate paid to the principal in the three months
prior to the principal debtor's default under the loan agreement.
183. The period is normally no longer than required to effect a commercially reasonable dis-
position of the principal debtor's assets.
184. This is particularly true in the case of many of the entrepreneurs who enter into financing
arrangements with commercial finance companies. Such people take the responsibilities of their
corporation as their own, notwithstanding the corporate legal fiction.
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